State of Utah v. Glen Ray Bullock : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
State of Utah v. Glen Ray Bullock : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James H. Beadles; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Allan K.
Jeppesen; Attorneys for Appellee.
Wayne A. Freestone; David C. Cundick; Parker, Freestone, Angerhofer & Harding; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Glen Ray Bullock, No. 960119 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/89
UT/>H 
K F U 
"5tr II • IN I • • III I I I ! I—l-M 
IN THE UTAH C0DRT 0F APP^S ^ ^ W ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GLEN RAY BULLOCK 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 96GHUUH-ICN 
P r i o r i t y No,, |3| 
i • ii ii • • • ii i 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
II II i • • • II • ! • • • .In • • I I • 
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ONE COUNT OF ASSMUTIflVI 
PRISONER, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION IDHI Mrjkfl 1fcjClDHI 
ANNOTATED, TITLE 7 6 , CHAPTER 5, SECTION 102 .5,\\ KM PUR |||fIfI|F|I> 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATREJIIQIJ MTJWVI 
JUDGE LEE DEVER, PRESIDING. 
WAYNE A. FREESTONE 
DAVID C. CUNDICK 
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER 
& HARDING 
50 WEST 300 SOUTH, #900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 328-5600 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
ALLAN K. JEPPESaw 
DEPUTY TOOELE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
4 7 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UTAH 84]0Jf]| 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY g O f t l W 
236 STATE CAPITQL,, BU^LPING 
SALT LAKE CITY 11JwiH IBMJ.M 
ATTORNEY'S FOR 
'FJEED 
DCTIDUR 19% 
CO^RriCMflltPftjrAi
 s 
1M THE HI1 AH I'IHTRT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
L"i,.i i HI i r t /Appe J 1 ^ e, 
GLEN RAY BULLOCK 
13 e £ e n d a i M App e 11 an t 
Case No. 96 0119-CA 
Priority No 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL F^" * -*^R.-. • • - -^ T- ^^ 'NT ~ ASSAULT 
PRISONER, ; : -IHD DEGREE FELOL 
ANNOTATED, TITLE CHAPTER 5, SECT: N 1 .. : 
C "" . ' - - ;OGELE CCLNTY, STATE F 
JUDGE LEE DEVER, PRESIDING. 
<A> 
WAYNE A. FREESTONE 
DAVID C. CUNDICK 
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER 
8c HARDING 
50 WEST 300 SOUTH, #900 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 328-5600 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
ALLAN K. JEPPESEN 
DEPUTY TOOELE COUNTv ATTORNEY 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UTAH 8404 7 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 STATE CAPITOL BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
ATTOHN''' APPELLEE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JUDGE ' S VERDICT 6 
CONCLUSION 9 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
State v. Johnson. ^ L992) 1 
State v. Lemon. 844 P. 2d > :i - « ) 5 
State v. Dunn. 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100 (Utah 1993) 5 
STATUTES AND RULE 
Utah -Jude Ann §76-5-102.5 (1995) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 1, 2 
I i 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for assault on a 
prisoner, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-102.5. This court has jurisdiction over the matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support 
the verdict of the judge? The standard of review is based upon a 
"review of the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict" or findings of the court in a bench trial, State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah, 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26, 1995, defendant was charged with assault on a 
prisoner, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-102.5 (R. 1-2). The charge stemmed from defendant's 
actions towards Ronnie Niel Tischner occurring on or about 
October 10, 1995 (R. 1-2). In a bench trial, the court convicted 
the defendant of the charge, (Tr. 164), and subsequently 
sentenced the defendant to a term of not more than five years, to 
be served at the Utah State Prison (R. 70). 
STATEMENT OF THE PACTS 
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A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant, Glen Ray Bullock, was convicted by bench trial in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, on December 19, 
1996, of assault on a prisoner, a third-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1995) (Tr. 164). On 
February 5, 1996, Glen Ray Bullock was sentenced by Judge Lee 
Dever to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five 
years (R. 70). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition 
Defendant was charged in an information dated October 26, 
1996, with assault on a prisoner, a third-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1995), (R. 1-2). Prior 
to preliminary examination, Glen Ray Bullock filed with the Third 
District Court, County of Tooele a motion for discovery (R. 4-7). 
A preliminary hearing was held in this matter on November 8, 
1995, (R. 13). Prior to this hearing, an entrance of counsel and 
request for jury trial was entered (R. 8-9). The request for 
jury trial was later waived by the defendant (R. 38). Following 
the preliminary hearing the defendant was bound-over to the Third 
District Court on the charge (R. 16). At an arraignment held on 
November 16, 1995, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, 
Bullock entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge (R. 17). 
Prior to trial, Bullock filed with the district court a 
motion to suppress all written statements and all verbal 
statements (R. 30-33), and a motion to suppress the statement of 
Ronnie Niel Tischner (34-36) . On November 30, 1996, an 
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evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable John A. Rokich 
on Bullock's pre-trial motions (R. 37). 
At the close of this hearing Judge Rokich denied Bullock's 
motions to suppress (R. 3 7). 
Defendant's bench trial was originally set for set for 
December 5, 1995, (R. 16), but was later postponed and actually 
held on December 19, 1995 (R. 46). On December 19, 1996, a bench 
trial was held in this matter with Judge Lee Dever presiding (R. 
46). At the bench trial Bullock was represented by David C. 
Cundick (Tr. 100) . Bullock was convicted by the court on 
December 19, 1995 (R. 46). After trial, Bullock filed a motion 
to arrest judgment or for new trial (R. 57-58) . The motion was 
denied and Bullock was sentenced to a term of not more than five 
years at the Utah State Prison (R. 70). 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on February 21, 1996, by David 
C. Cundick, and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On October 10, 1996, Ronnie Tischner, an inmate at the 
Tooele County Jail, was watching television in Unit A when he 
felt something on the back of his neck (Tr. 107) . Mr. Tischner 
realized that someone had placed shaving cream on the back of his 
neck (Tr. 107). He became angry and accused two young men of 
putting the shaving cream on him (Tr. 108). At this point the 
defendant stepped in and told Mr. Tischner that it was he who had 
put the shaving cream on Mr. Tischner's neck (Tr. 141-142). Mr. 
Tischner, at trial, identified the defendant as the person who 
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admitted to putting shaving cream on Mr. Tischnerfs neck (Tr. 
Ill). Mr. Tischner made a comment to the defendant asking the 
defendant what he was doing (Tr. 108). The two individuals then 
became antagonistic towards each other calling each other names 
and threatening violence towards each other (Tr. 142). At this 
point Mr. Tischner turned and proceeded to return to his cell 
(Tr. 108). The defendant proceeded to follow Mr. Tischner to his 
cell, cell A-l (Tr. 133, 135). The defendant never quite entered 
Mr. Tischner's cell, but instead the defendant reared back and 
said "Don't fuck with me" (Tr. 133). As Mr. Tischner entered his 
cell he was hit on the back of the neck, fell forward and split 
open his eye when he hit the bunk bed (Tr. 109). When Mr. 
Tischner arose, there was no one around him (Tr. 109). At this 
point a Mr. Ramirez entered Mr. Tischner's cell and told Mr. 
Tischner that he needed stitches for the cut to his eye (Tr. 
110). Mr. Tischner proceeded to the infirmary for medical 
treatment (Tr. ill). He was intercepted by Deputy Joe Walker who 
noticed that Mr. Tischner was bleeding quite profusely (Tr. 118) . 
Deputy Walker was on his way to investigate the problem in Unit A 
(Tr. 117-118). When questioned by Deputy Walker Mr. Tischner 
responded that he had been hit from behind and pushed into the 
bunk bed by the defendant (Tr. 124). Deputy Walker called 
another officer to escort Mr. Tischner to the hospital for 
treatment (Tr. 119). Deputy Walker was later in the control unit 
when he received a call over the intercom from the defendant who 
wanted to explain his side of the altercation (Tr. 119, 121). 
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The intercom control panel lights indicated that it was an 
intercom call from cell A-3 (Tr. 127), and that the only person 
in cell A-3 at the time of the call was the defendant (Tr. 127) . 
Deputy Walker then heard the defendant apologize over the 
intercom for striking Mr. Tischner but that he did so in self-
defense (Tr. 121). Deputy Walker concluded it was the defendant 
not only from the control panel lights but that he recognized the 
defendant's voice as the one on the intercom due to his previous 
interactions with the defendant (Tr. 127-128). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In order to convict a criminal defendant the State must 
prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Mr. Bullock asserts that the State failed to meet its 
burden and therefore his conviction should be reversed. 
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal Mr. 
Bullock carries a great burden. He "must marshall all evidence 
supporting the ... verdict and must then show how this marshaled 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Lemon, 844 
P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted). Bullock must 
show that the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100 
(Utah 1993) . The element which Mr. Bullock alleges as unproven 
is the element which requires the state to prove beyond a 
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reasonable doubt that the defendant was the individual who 
committed the crime. 
Bullock has marshaled all of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict in his statement of the facts. However, 
Mr. Bullock will likewise marshal here the evidence that is 
relevant to his sufficiency argument. 
ARGUMENT 
The first point is that the testimony of Ronnie Tischner 
must create reasonable doubt. Following the confrontation 
between Mr. Bullock and Mr. Tischner, Mr. Tischner turned to 
return to his cell (Tr. 108). Mr. Tischner stated that he could 
not tell if Mr. Bullock was following him, and even further he 
was not sure if anyone was following him at all (Tr. 108-109, 
112-113) . Mr. Tischner testified that after he was hit he got up 
and there was no one around and that he was uncertain whether the 
defendant was anywhere near his cell (Tr. 109,113). Mr. Tischner 
never testified that it was the defendant who hit him. On the 
contrary, Mr. Tischner states that he was not sure if the 
defendant was following him at all and that when he arose there 
was no one around. In conjunction with this testimony, Mr. 
Tischner testified that he "just assumed" it was the defendant 
who pushed him, and that he "felt" it was the defendant (Tr. 
114). Reasonable doubt cannot be overcome by assumptions and 
feelings. There is not one scintilla of evidence arising from 
Mr. Tischner's testimony which would allow a reasonable mind to 
go beyond a reasonable doubt. The only positive identification 
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made by Mr. Tischner is that it was the defendant who put the 
shaving cream on his neck (Tr. Ill); no positive identification 
as to the defendant being the person who pushed Mr. Tischner was 
ever made by Mr. Tischner. 
The second point is that the testimony of Deputy Joe Walker 
would have to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of a 
reasonable person. Deputy Walker testified on direct and on 
cross examination that the intercom call came from cell A-3 as he 
recognized the voice (Tr. 127-128). This testimony was bolstered 
by the fact that deputy Walker testified that the intercom light 
panel indicated that the call came from cell A-3 (Tr. 127) and 
that the only person in cell A-3 was the defendant (Tr. 127). 
The defendant was then called to testify at which time the 
defendant stated that his assigned cell was A-ll, not A-3 (Tr. 
145) . This testimony was corroborated by defense witness Kevin 
John Reeder (Tr. 134). The defendant testified that cell A-3 
belonged to two other individuals and that it was against the 
rules to enter into another persons cell (Tr. 149). Therefore, 
it was impossible for him to have been in cell A-3 when Deputy 
Walker received the intercom call as the defendant had never been 
in cell A-3 (Tr. 157). 
Following the defendants testimony Deputy Joe Walker was 
called as a State rebuttal witness. At this time Deputy Walker 
changed his testimony so as to conform to the testimony given by 
the defendant. Deputy Walker testified as a rebuttal witness 
that the call actually came from cell A-ll and that was the cell 
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to which the defendant was assigned at the time of the incident 
(Tr. 151). Deputy Walker testified that the defendant is 
currently assigned to cell A-3 and that is why he was mistaken on 
his earlier testimony (Tr. 151). Deputy Walker then testified 
that the intercom indicator light identified the call as coming 
from cell A-ll, not cell A-3 (Tr. 151). However, this testimony 
is also flawed as on cross-examination Deputy Walker once again 
changed his testimony to agree to the fact that the defendant is 
currently assigned to cell A-4, not cell A-3, and Officer Walker 
acknowledged as much (Tr. 152). 
The many times Deputy Walker was mistaken must have created 
a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. Deputy 
Walker first stated that the control panel indicator lights 
showed the call as coming from cell A-3, then changed his 
testimony to say that the indicator lights showed that the call 
came from cell A-ll. Had Deputy Walker stuck to his original 
testimony, Mr. Bullock would have been found not guilty as the 
admission of guilt could then not possibly have come from Mr. 
Bullock as he was never in cell A-3. A finding of guilt was only 
possible after Deputy Walker changed his testimony to conform to 
the testimony of the defendant. 
The third point which must raise a reasonable doubt comes 
from the testimony of the only direct witness to the incident. 
Kevin John Reeder was called as a defense witness (Tr. 131). Mr. 
Reeder testified that the defendant never entered Mr. Tischner's 
cell, but remained outside the cell (Tr. 133). Mr. Reeder 
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testified that he did not, at any time, see the defendant strike 
Mr. Tischner (Tr. 136-137, 138) and that he only saw the 
defendant rear back as if to avoid being struck (Tr. 135) . 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mr. Bullock requests that this court reverse his conviction 
because the evidence introduced at trial is "sufficiently 
inconclusive" and that "reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted," as the evidence was insufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did indeed commit 
the crime. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 1996. 
David C. Cundick 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of October, 1996,1 caused to be mailed postage 
prepaid, two copies of the foregoing brief to the following party at the address indicated. 
Jan Graham, Esq. 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
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ADDENDUM 
197 CRIMINAL CODE 76-5-106.5 
Section 
70.5-408. Reserved. 
76-5-4^9. Corroboration of admission by child's state-
ment. 
76-5-410. Child victim of sexual abuse as competent 
witness. 
76-5-4H- Admissibility of out-of-court statement of child 
victim of sexual abuse. 
Part 5 
HIV Testing — Sexual Offenders and Victims 
76-5-501. Definitions. 
76-5-502. Mandatory testing — Liability for costs. 
76-5-503. Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Costs 
paid by Crime Victim Reparations. 
76-5-504. Victim notification and counseling. 
PARTI 
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined. 
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who 
is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or 
who is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility 
used for confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the 
Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the con-
finement is legal. 1994 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes 
substantial bodily injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused 
caused serious bodily injury to another. 1996 
76-5-102.3. Assault against school employees. 
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or 
private school, with knowledge that the individual is an 
employee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of 
his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor. 
(2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer. 
1992 
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer. 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge 
that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 1987 
76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause 
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 1974 
76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material 
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional 
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1994 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
( D A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to an-
other; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection dXa) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony. 
1995 
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner. 
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a felony of the 
first degree, who commits aggravated assault is guilty of a 
felony of the second degree. 
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a capital felony or a 
felony of the first degree who commits aggravated assault is 
guilty of: 
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury 
was caused; or 
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was inten-
tionally caused. 1996 
76-5-104. Consensual altercation no defense to homi-
cide or assault if dangerous weapon used. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of 
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that 
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or 
other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel, 
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 was used. 1989 
76-5-105. Mayhem. 
[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally de-
prives a human being of a member of his body, or disables or 
renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue, puts 
out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem. 
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree. 1973 
76-5-106. Harassment. 
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to 
frighten or harass another, he communicates a written or 
recorded threat to commit any violent felony. 
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 1995 
76-5-106.5. Definitions — Crime of stalking. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining 
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly 
conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a 
person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, 
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the household 
within the prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of 
his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury 
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of 
his immediate family will suffer emotional distress; 
and 
78-2a-3 jUDjCjAL CODE 
tern of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upotf 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeal 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum o^  
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment if 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be b/ 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. Th^ 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of * 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en ban£' 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presio1' 
ing judge from among the members of the court by majorit/ 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge A 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge 0* 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than tw^ 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide fo*" 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge.
 f 
(4^  The presiding judge may be removed from the office 0* 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court <r 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court (T 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court <?* 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Cou^ 
(5; Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as fiT 
the Supreme Court. 19** 
78-2a«3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1, The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all e*" 
traordmary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary' 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and d^ * 
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, inclu^" 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . 
'a) the final orders and decrees resulting from form* 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals fro**1 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed" 
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Comxni** 
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institution^ 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Ftfe 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive dire^* 
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of O**' 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b> appeals from the district court review of: . 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of politic* 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; a*1^ 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Secttf*1 
63-46a-12.1; 
fc"1 appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record & 
criminal cases excs^t th^se UVVQIVYO^ a chai^fe <tf a ^ t 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cas^5' 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree °T 
capital felony; 
(f; appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or servi*1^ 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constitute 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a fl*'st 
degree or capital felony; 
(g' appeals from the orders on petitions for extraor^1" 
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board ° 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involvi*' 
degree or capital felony; 7* 
(n) appeals from district court involving don 
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divon 
raent, property division, child custody, support < 
adoption, and paternity; ' 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeal* fcjzi 
Supreme Court. ^ " 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the So 
Court for original appellate review and detenninatii 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original ao 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the 
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Pn. 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court 
Review of the judgments, orders, ana decrees of the Coinfl 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari tojj 
Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt L 3 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functioS 
any location within the state. 
CHAPTERS 
QISXOLGX CQUBXS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system — Procedure — 
Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.2. District court case management. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeiture!. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports [Effective until January 1, 19971. 
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports [Effective January 1, 1997]. 
^Vo-^^b. l^ata^ases W juaicia'i^arQS. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
